The Communist Party understood that its own attack against bourgeois society, an attack whose motive force had been social resentment, did not correspond to the political needs of the situation, and even lacked decisive objectives. It realized, that by its position of principle, it could only assemble the industrial and uprooted proletariat and that the important social layers, pressing to escape the influence of the bourgeoisie, remained deaf to their appeals. Consequently, it searched to replace by tactics that which it lacked by nature. Thus it lead to the line of Scheringer and the agrarian communist program. It is these two phenomena of adaptation, that were imposed on them by exterior circumstances and that are, in no fashion, a reaction directed by their own nature.
For this reason, it lacks the force to convince. The agricultural program, although adapted to the peasant’s sentiment of life and their conception of the world, does not create a true opening towards the rural population. The peasant scented there an “intention,” a trap, and remained on guard. The communist agricultural program did not represent a conviction but was the result of absolutely arbitrary calculations. And when arbitrary calculations come in, the bases are flimsy. Certainly, the Scheringer line was an attempt to occupy “nationalist positions.” But in the meantime, it must realize that the Communist Party was not used to fighting on this terrain. Already the cause of mutinies in their own ranks, they cannot maintain it. The Westernized industrial proletariat no longer has such psychological and popular depth to be the bearer of the heavy duty of nationalist politics. For this reason, the German Communist Party is Trotskyite, although it is on the side of Stalin. Leninism, which represented a reality of a total state, requires a living fullness, a fullness that is this party no longer has, but that the Russian worker, always attached to his village, still guards in himself.